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Abstract—In this paper, the problem of uplink user association
in small cell networks, which involves interactions between users,
small cell base stations, and macro-cell stations, having often
conflicting objectives, is considered. The problem is formulated
as a college admissions game with transfers in which a number
of colleges, i.e., small cell and macro-cell stations seek to recruit
a number of students, i.e., users. In this game, the users and
access points (small cells and macro-cells) rank one another based
on preference functions that capture the users’ need to optimize
their utilities which are functions of packet success rate (PSR) and
delay as well as the small cells’ incentive to extend the macro-cell
coverage (e.g., via cell biasing/range expansion) while maintaining
the users’ quality-of-service. A distributed algorithm that combines
notions from matching theory and coalitional games is proposed to
solve the game. The convergence of the algorithm is shown and the
properties of the resulting assignments are discussed. Simulation
results show that the proposed approach yields a performance
improvement, in terms of the average utility per user, reaching up
to 23% relative to a conventional, best-PSR algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Meeting the stringent quality-of-service (QoS) requirements
of emerging wireless services warrants substantial changes in
current cellular infrastructure. In this respect, the introduction
of small cell base stations (SCBSs) (picocells, microcells, fem-
tocells, etc.) is seen as a promising, cost-effective solution [1–3].
Small cells are low-cost, low-power, access points that can be
overlaid on any existing wireless technology (e.g., 2G, 3G, LTE,
WiMAX, etc.) and can be of different types that include outdoor,
operator-deployed picocells, metrocells and microcells, as well
as indoor, user-deployed femtocells [1]. These SCBSs are seen
as a key approach for offloading traffic from the macro-cell
network while providing high capacities by bringing the users
and their access points closer to one another [2].
For reaping the benefits of small cell deployment, numer-
ous technical challenges must be addressed such as resource
management, interference avoidance, and user association [2],
[4–9]. In [5], the authors formulate a hierarchical power control
game between the macro-cellular base station and the small cells
so as to reduce the interference. The authors in [10] study the
problem of cell range expansion in picocell networks and derive
fundamental results. Further, a novel approach for spectrum
allocation in two-tier networks is proposed in [11]. In [6], a new
approach for resource allocation in heterogeneous networks is
developed via auctions. Other aspects of small cell networks are
studied in [7–9]
One key challenge in small cell networks that remains rela-
tively unexplored, as outlined in [1] and [12] (and references
therein), is the problem of associating the users to their serving
access point for uplink transmission, in particular. Inherently,
This research was supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation
under Grants CNS-1253731, CNS-1265268, CNS-1117560, ECCS-1028782,
and CNS-0953377.
within a small cell network, the problem of user association
in the uplink faces a number of pertinent challenges that are
significantly different from classical cellular user association
problems such as those in [13] and [14]. On the one hand,
unlike macro-cell base stations, SCBSs are resource-constrained
in nature (e.g., can service only a small number of users and
have limited coverage) which can significantly impact the user
association problem. On the other hand, within a small cell
network, the outcome of any access point selection process must
account for the preferences of three node types (and not just the
users as in cellular networks): the users, the SCBSs, and the
macro-cell stations, having different, often conflicting, goals.
From the users’ perspective, the goal is primarily to select a
serving station, irrespective of its type (macro-cell or SCBS),
that optimizes a certain QoS requirement. For the SCBSs, the
objective is not only to select the users with certain desired QoS
requirements, but also to improve the coverage of the macro-cell
network and alleviate the load on its stations. Offloading data
is, in fact, viewed as the primary role of SCBSs, particularly
those deployed by an operator in outdoor environments such
as picocells [1], [2], [15]. Finally, the macro-cell stations
aim at improving the QoS of their users while ensuring that
every user gets a chance to transmit. Often, these objectives
are intertwined and can lead to conflicting user assignment
choices. For example, the most preferred access point of a
certain user might be interested in assigning other users that are
more aligned with its own utility metrics (e.g., allow a better
offloading) and vice versa. These new challenges motivate the
design of novel approaches for user-to-access point assignment
tailored to small cell networks, which is our main focus. In fact,
it has been recently shown [12] that, in the downlink, applying
classical macro-cell oriented schemes to small cell networks can
lead to highly unequal loads and operating inefficiencies. The
work in [12] developed an optimization problem for maximizing
capacity during user association in the downlink of small cell
networks. To our best knowledge, beyond [12], which is focused
on downlink problem and on centralized optimization, little
work has been done to address the SCBSs user to access point
association problem in the uplink while accounting for the
aforementioned challenges.
The main contributions of this paper are to study and design,
using analytical techniques from game theory, novel strategies
for assigning users to their serving access points within the
uplink of a small cell network. Here, we exploit the striking
analogy between the small cells’ user association problem and
the college admissions game that is studied in the game theory
literature. We formulate a college admissions game in which
colleges, i.e., access points (SCBSs and macro-cells) that have a
fixed quota (number of students to admit) and students, i.e., net-
2work users, rank one another based on preference functions that
capture, for the users, the R-factor which is a well-known metric
capturing the packet success rate and delay guarantees and, for
the access points, the need to service users with good quality of
service while extending the macro-cell coverage (e.g., similar
to the emerging idea of biasing or cell range expansion [1],
[12], [15]). To solve this game, we propose an algorithm that
takes into account the interdependent users’ preferences and that
allows each node to optimize its specific utility needs. Using
analytical techniques based on the college admissions game and
coalitional game theory, we provide a novel formulation for the
problem of access point selection tailored to the unique features
of small cell wireless networks (e.g., different decision makers,
conflicting goals, limited SCBS capacity, etc.). We show that,
using the proposed approach, the users, SCBSs, and macro-cells
can agree on a user association outcome, given their different
preferences. We show the convergence of the algorithm and we
analyze the properties of the resulting assignment. We assess
the performance of the algorithm using simulations and show
that it yields significant performance gains for all nodes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the proposed system model. In Section III, we
formulate the problem as a college admissions game with
transfers while in Section IV we propose an algorithm for net-
work assignment. Simulation results are presented in Section V.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
Consider a wireless network composed of M cells with
their associated base stations, i.e., macro-stations. N wireless
users are deployed and seek to transmit in the uplink direction.
Hereinafter, we refer to this main network as the macro-cell
network. K SCBSs are overlaid on the macro-cell network to
increase coverage and improve the performance of the users. We
letM, K, and N , denote, respectively, the set of all macro-cell
base stations, all SCBSs, and all users.
Each SCBS k ∈ K is a low-cost access point that can
serve a limited number of users, i.e., has a maximum quota
of qk users. We mainly focus on outdoor SCBSs such as
picocells/microcells/metrocells that are used by the operator to
offload data by serving any of the N macro-cell users when
needed [1], [2]. We note that the quota of an SCBS can be either
fixed or controlled by the SCBS operator who may decide to
allow less or more users to connect [1]. Further, we consider
that all SCBSs and macro-stations use a time-division multiple-
access scheduler with each time slot having a duration θ. Note
that, using such a transmission for the uplink implies that the
users which are assigned to the same SCBS or macro-station do
not interfere with one another, i.e., there no intra-access point
(SCBS or macro-station) interference. Note that the analysis
done in this paper is equally applicable to other multiple access
and scheduling schemes, e.g., advanced QoS-aware schedulers
such as those in [1] and references therein. For brevity, we use
the term access point to refer to a macro-station or an SCBS if
the explicit distinction is not needed.
A key problem in small cell networks is to associate the users
to their serving access points which are either macro-stations
or SCBSs [1]. An illustrative figure of this problem is shown in
Fig. 1 for a network withM = 3 macro-stations,K = 3 SCBSs,
Fig. 1. An illustration of a small cell network network with M = 3 macro-
stations, K = 3 SCBSs, and N = 16 users.
and N = 16 users. Fig. 1 shows how the SCBSs can extend the
coverage of the macro-stations, notably, SCBSs 2 and 3 enable
servicing users that are far away from macro-stations 3 (e.g.,
user 12) and 1 (e.g., user 7), respectively. At SCBS 1, which can
service at most 4 users, we can see how the different objectives
of the nodes and the limitations of the SCBSs impact the user
assignment. For example, although user 4 prefers to connect
to SCBS 1 over macro-station 1 due to proximity, this user is
eventually assigned to macro-station 1. This assignment is a
result of the fact that SCBS 1 needs to also assist in offloading
traffic from the macro-cell network by servicing users that are
further away from the macro-stations, e.g., users 1, 2, 3, and 6.
Also, Fig. 1 shows how some users, such as user 8, prefer lightly
loaded stations such as SCBS 2 over closer, yet congested access
points such as macro-station 1. Thus, Fig. 1 sheds light on the
challenges of designing assignment schemes in the uplink of
small cell networks.
B. Objectives of the Nodes
Users’ goals: In the uplink, each user i ∈ N chooses an
access point a ∈ A , M ∪ K, and, thus, achieves a signal-
to-interference plus noise ratio γia and perceives a delay τa.
Each user i ∈ N wants to select an access point a ∈ A so
as to optimize its probability of successful transmission and its
perceived delay. The packet success rate (PSR) ρia of any user
i ∈ N that needs to transmits packets of B bits each to an
access point a ∈ A is
ρia = (1− P
e
ia(γia))
B , (1)
where P eia(γia) is the bit error rate (BER) from user i to its
serving station a and is a function of γia =
Pigia
σ2+Ia
with Pi
being the transmit power of user i, σ2 the noise variance, Ia the
inter-access point interference temperature1 at a, and gia =
1
dα
ia
the channel gain between user i and access point a with dia
the distance between i and a, and α the path loss exponent2.
Essentially, the expression for the BER depends on the coding
and modulation schemes adopted by user i. The analysis done
in the remainder of this paper is applicable to any coding
and modulation scheme. Note that, in practice, interference
1
Ia is a measure of the average interference temperature at a incurred from
potential uplink transmissions at other access points that can interfere with a
(e.g., share the spectrum with a) that is commonly used in dimensioning small
cell networks [1].
2We note that the choice of this channel model is made for convenience and
without loss of generality since the proposed game-theoretic approach is also
applicable when the channel gain encompasses other propagation characteristics
such as shadowing effects and multi-path fading.
3between SCBSs is often considered to be well-managed (e.g.,
by allowing the SCBSs to perform sensing so as to avoid using
the same part of the spectrum or using other methods) such as
in [4], [16], [17]. Hence, Ia is mostly a measure of the macro-
to-femto interference temperature which can also be improved
or canceled by having a macro-cell that uses a dedicated band
such as in [1] or using techniques such as in [16]. Hereafter,
we consider a slowly varying block fading channel model with
a long coherence time that is constant over the slot duration θ.
Given an access point a ∈ A that serves a subset of users
Na ⊆ N , each user i ∈ Na experiences a delay τa that is
mainly dominated by two components, a wireless access delay
τwa and a backhaul delay τ
b
a , such that
τa = τ
w
a + τ
b
a. (2)
The wireless access delay τwa depends primarily on the number
of users connected to a, i.e., Na = |Na| where | · | denotes the
set cardinality. Given the considered users’ scheduler, we have
τwa = (Na − 1) · θ, (3)
where θ is the slot duration. The delay over the backhaul τ ba at an
access point a depends on several factors such as the capability
of the backbone, its connectivity (e.g., to the Internet), the
backbone topology, as well as the traffic which is generated, not
only by the users in Na but also from third-party applications
or service providers. Hence, providing accurate models for the
delay over the backhaul network is a challenging research
problem that is solved often using empirical measurements
[18] and is beyond the scope of this paper. Since our focus
is mainly on the user association problem, we consider that
the delay τ ba over the backhaul during a given time period is
a random variable having a certain observed distribution. Due
to the technical differences between the backbone connecting
the macro-stations (which can be a high-speed network, e.g.,
fiber) and the one connecting the SCBSs (which is a standard IP
backaul, e.g, DSL), we distinguish between the characteristics
of the distribution of the backhaul delay at a macro-cell, i.e.,
τ bm,m ∈M and at a small cell, i.e., τ
b
k , k ∈ K.
Each user i ∈ N selects an access point a ∈ A so as
to optimize its PSR in (1) and its delay in (2). One suitable
metric that captures both PSR and delay is the R-factor which
is popular within voice over IP (VoIP) services [19]. For a user
i, the R-factor is an expression that links the delay and packet
loss to the voice quality as follows:
Ui(ρia, τa) = Ω− 1τa − 2(τa − α3)H − υ1
−υ2 ln (1 + 100υ3(1− ρia)), (4)
where τa is the delay given by (2) expressed in milliseconds,
and 100(1 − ρia) represents the packet loss percentage. The
remaining parameters are constants defined as: Ω = 94.2, 1 =
0.024, 2 = 0.11, 3 = 177.3, H = 0 if τj < 3, H = 1
otherwise [19]. The parameters υ1, υ2, and υ3 depend on the
codec as per the e-model [19]. The relationship between the R-
factor and the VoIP service quality is such that as the R-factor
increases, by increments of 10, from 50 to 100, the voice quality
is poor, acceptable, good, high, and best, respectively [19].
SCBSs and macro-stations goals: The SCBSs have two
objectives: 1) to offload traffic from the macro-cell, extend
its coverage, and load balance the traffic (e.g., use cell range
expansion or biasing) and, 2) to select users that can potentially
experience a good R-factor. For exploiting the full potential of
SCBS deployments, it is desirable to actively “push” wireless
users onto the SCBSs while maintaining a good QoS, when
possible due to two reason: (i) the SCBSs will often be lightly
loaded, thus a better load balancing strategy is required; and (ii)
this allows offloading of traffic and reducing the load on the
main macro-cell network. To assist the macro-cell by extending
its coverage and offloading users, an SCBS k benefits from
selecting the users in poor macro-cell coverage areas, i.e., users
that experience the largest packet drop at the macro-stations
(e.g., far from these stations). However, at the same time, an
SCBS k also extracts more utility by selecting users that can
potentially experience a good QoS when connected to k. Many
techniques have recently been studied to allow efficient offload.
In particular, the idea of cell biasing or cell range expansion
which has been recently proposed suggests forcing users to
maintain their connections at smaller tiers (e.g., at SCBSs) by
“biasing” their transmit power with a multiplicative factor [12],
[20].
From the perspective of an SCBS, the dominating indicator
on the R-factor of a given user i ∈ N is the PSR as per (1).
Therefore, in general, the benefit (utility) that any SCBS k ∈ K
obtains by serving a user i ∈ N , can be written as
hk(i) = f(ρik, ρim), (5)
where ρik is the PSR from user i to SCBS k, ρim is the
PSR from user i to its best macro-station m, i.e., m ∈
argmaxl∈M ρil, and f(·) is a function that is increasing in ρik,
i.e., better PSR at k implies higher benefit, and decreasing in
ρim, i.e., a bad PSR at a macro-station m implies that SCBS k
gets more benefit by offloading i from the macro-cell network.
Although the analysis in the rest of this paper applies to any
function f(·), we use the following function which represents
a cell range expansion-oriented metric:
hk(i) = β
ρik
ρim
, (6)
with β a price per PSR ratio that allows the operator to control
the “bias” for offloading traffic. Clearly, the utility in (6) is in
line with the recent efforts on cell biasing/range expansion [12],
[20] and presents an interesting way to control and quantify this
bias.
Finally, the benefit that any macro-station m ∈ M extracts
from a user i ∈ N is simply an increasing function of the PSR
achieved by i at m as follows:
wm(i) = ρim. (7)
Having laid down the main components of the studied model,
in the next section, we formulate the access point assignment
problem as a college admissions game.
III. A COLLEGE ADMISSIONS GAME FOR ACCESS POINT
SELECTION
A. Game Formulation and Preferences
To formally model the studied problem, we use the frame-
work of college admissions games, also known as many-to-one
matching games [21], [22]. The college admissions problem, as
introduced in [21], models the interactions between a number
of students wishing to apply to a number of colleges, each of
which has a fixed quota on the number of students that it can
admit. Given often conflicting preferences between the students
and the colleges, it is of interest to study how one can assign
the students to colleges while satisfying, as much as possible,
all preferences [21], [22]. This framework is suitable for the
4proposed problem as it allows capture of the heterogeneous
nature of a small cell network while characterizing stable
and desirable association points. Within the studied small cell
network, we formulate a college admissions game, referred to as
the small cell admissions game, defined by three components:
1) the set N of wireless users acting a students, 2) the set A
of access points acting as colleges, each access point having
a certain quota on the maximum number of users that it can
admit, and, 3) preference relations for the access points and
users allowing them to build preferences over one another. The
solution of this game is an assignment between the users and
the access points that satisfies their preferences and constraints.
We consider that all players (users, SCBS, macro-station) are
honest nodes that do not cheat during the association process.
The case in which one or more nodes are cheating can constitute
an interesting topic for future work that is out of the scope of
the current paper. Here, we note that matching games have been
recently used in basic wireless resource allocation [23], [24]
and cognitive radio [25]. However, unlike the work done here,
these existing approaches do not deal with the specifics of small
cell networks and are focused mostly on one-to-one matching.
Moreover, they do not explore the idea of college transfers,
needed to handle the coupling between users’ strategies.
Due to its low cost nature, any SCBS k ∈ K can service
only a maximum number (quota) qk of users (typically a
small value [1]). For the macro-stations, although no physical
constraints impose a maximum quota, each macro-station m ∈
M sets a certain quota of users qm that it is willing to accept.
Specifically, in order to ensure that every available user will
eventually be serviced, each macro-station m ∈M chooses its
quota qm to be equal to the maximum number of users that will
potentially connect to m, in the absence of SCBSs and based
on a standard assignment in which each user chooses its closest
macro-station.
A preference relation i for a college (student) is defined as
a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relation over the set
of all students (colleges)3. Using these preferences, the access
points and the users can rank one another. For an SCBS k ∈ K,
we define a preference relation k over the set of users N ,
such that, for any two users i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, we have
i k j ⇔ hk(i) ≥ hk(j), (8)
where hk(·) is given by (6). In other words, the SCBSs can
rank their users by giving a preference to the ones that generate
a higher benefit as per (6). For any macro-station m ∈ M, a
preference relation m over the set of users N , is defined as
follows, for any two users i, j ∈ N , i 6= j:
i m j ⇔ wm(i) ≥ wm(j), (9)
where wm(·) is given by (7). Thus, the macro-stations simply
rank the users based on the PSR. Note that, in a college
admissions game it is often desirable to have strict preferences,
denoted by , and, thus, hereinafter, we consider that whenever
any player is indifferent between two choices, it will randomly
rank one before the other (e.g., toss a coin).
While for the access points, one can build preferences based
on the utilities in (6) and (7), dealing with the users’ preferences
introduces some complications. In particular, the R-factor of the
3Variants of this game allow the colleges to build preferences over subsets
of students [22]. However, in wireless networks, such a model would be
undesirable since its complexity for building preferences grows exponentially
with the network size as per the Bell number [22].
users as in (4) depends on the number of other users admitted
at a given access point through the delay component. Thus, if
one defines a preference relation for the users based on (4), this
relation will depend on the choices of the other users, due to
the interdependence in the delay. In this respect, most literature
that deals with the college admissions game [21], [22] assumes
that the preferences of the students do not depend on other
students’ choices. Although such an assumption is reasonable
within game theory, it does not hold in the proposed small cells
game. As discussed in [22], when dealing with interdependent
preferences, finding acceptable solutions for the general college
admissions game becomes complex. Even though putting some
restrictions on the preferences can make these solutions more
tractable, the additional constraints often require computing
preferences over all subsets of the users or access points [22],
which yields an exponential complexity that is unsuitable for
wireless communication problems in which the number of users
can grow significantly.
To overcome this challenge, we divide our proposed game
into two interdependent subgames: a small cell admission
subgame with R-factor guarantees and an access point transfers
subgame. In the first subgame, the users build their preferences
based on the potential R-factor guarantees that each access point
can guarantee. Based on the results of the first subgame, in the
second subgame, some of the users can request to transfer to
other access points (perform a college transfer) if possible (e.g.,
if some access points did not fill up their entire quotas).
B. Admissions Game with Guarantees
In the first subgame, the users build their preferences based on
the R-factor level that each access point a ∈ A can guarantee.
This R-factor guarantee depends on the maximum delay that
is experienced at a. Since, within a certain time period, each
access point is aware of an estimate of its backhaul delay, the
maximum delay τ¯a in (2) at an access point a ∈ A depends on
the maximum wireless access delay τ¯wa given by
τ¯wa = (qa − 1) · θ, (10)
where qa is the quota of access point a. As a result, the
maximum delay at an access point a is simply τ¯a = τ¯
w
a + τ
b
a .
In consequence, based on the maximum potential delay, every
user i ∈ N , can define a preference relation i such that, for
any two access points a, b ∈ A, a 6= b
a i b⇔ ui(a) ≥ ui(b), (11)
where ui(a) = Ui(ρia, τ¯a), with Ui(ρia, τ¯a) as in (4), is a
preference function that assigns for each access point a the
R-factor in (4) that a guarantees for user i.
Using the preferences in (8), (9), and (11), we can define the
first subgame as a college admissions problem with R-factor
guarantees. The solution of this subgame is a matching µ which
is a mapping defined on the set A ∪ N and satisfying, for all
access point a ∈ A and user i ∈ N , 1) µ(a) ∈ 2N , and,
2) µ(i) ∈ A×Bi∪{∅, ∅}, where 2
N is the set of all subsets of
N and Bi is the set of all subsets of N that contain user i. In
other words, µ is a mapping that assigns for every access point a
subset of users and for every user an access point. Alternatively,
the solution of this subgame can be seen as a partition Π of the
set N such that Π = {S1, . . . , SM+K}, Sa ∩ Sb = ∅, a 6=
b, ∪M+Kl=1 Sl = N and each Sa ⊆ N is a coalition of users
that are using access point a. If, for a given l ∈ {1, . . . ,M +
K}, Sl = ∅, then access point l has no users assigned to it.
5C. A Coalitional Game for College Transfers
Upon learning of the partition Π resulting from the small
cell admissions game with guarantees, the access points and
the users might have an incentive to negotiate potential user
transfers, depending on the actual perceived R-factor as per
(4). For example, if some access points within Π have used
very small fractions of their quotas, it can be beneficial to
transfer some users from highly loaded access points to the
lightly loaded access points. To study these inter-access point
transfers, we use the framework of coalitional game theory [26].
Formally, we define a coalitional game among the users that is
identified by the pair (N , V ) where N is the set of players,
i.e., users, and V is a mapping that assigns for every coalition
Sa ⊆ N , formed around an access point a, a payoff vector U in
which each element Ui(ρia, τa) is the R-factor of user i as per
(4). Here, each coalition Sa ⊆ N represents a group of users
that are connected to an access point a ∈ A.
In this (N , V ) coalitional game, one can see that the grand
coalition, i.e., all users forming a single coalition at a certain
access point, can never form due to the increased delay and the
fact that no access point can accommodate all the users in the
network. Instead, disjoint coalitions, each of which is centered
at a given access point, need to form. As a result, this game
is classified as a coalition formation game [26] in which the
objective is to enable the users to change from one coalition
to another, depending on their utilities, the acceptance of the
access points, and the different quotas. In order to achieve this
objective, for every user i, we formally define the following
transfer rule:
Definition 1: Transfer Rule - Consider any partition Π =
{S1, . . . , SM+K} of N , where Sa is a coalition served by an
access point a ∈ A. A user i has an incentive to transfer from
its current coalition Sa, for some a ∈ {1, . . . ,M+K} and join
another coalition Sb ∈ Π, Sa 6= Sb, if: 1) user i improves its
R-factor in (4) by transferring, i.e., Ui(ρib, τb) > Ui(ρia, τa),
and, 2) access points a and b approve of the transfer.
The acceptance of a transfer by the access points is dependent
upon their quotas and their willingness to allow the transfer. A
pair of access points a, b ∈ A are willing to accept the transfer
of a user i from a to b, if:
1) Access point b that is serving the users in Sb and which
will potentially accept the transfer Sb does not exceed its
quota qb, i.e., |Sb ∪ {i}| ≤ qb.
2) The social welfare, i.e., the overall R-factor, perceived at
both access points a and b is increased. Thus, we have
v(Sa\{i})+v(Sb ∪ {i}) > v(Sa)+v(Sb), where we define
v(Sa) =
∑
i∈Sa
Ui(ρia, τa) as the total utility generated by
a coalition Sa.
The motivation behind this acceptance rule is two-fold: 1) it
provides a way for the access points to participate and have
some control on the users coalitional game, and, 2) it enables a
collaboration between the access points that values the overall
social welfare of the network. Given that the coalitional transfers
game occurs after the first subgame, the transfer rule and its
corresponding acceptance criteria, enable the access points to
maintain some control over their initially preferred and accepted
users’ list. At this stage, any pair of access points a and b that
are involved in a transfer have an incentive to be cooperative,
i.e., to accept the transfer only in agreement, since, in the future,
they can be involved in other transfers in an opposite direction,
and, hence, require their peers’ potential future cooperation.
IV. GAME SOLUTION AND ALGORITHM
Thus far, we have modeled the access point game as a college
admissions game with transfers and decomposed it into two
subgames: an admissions game with R-factor guarantees and
a coalitional transfers game. As a solution, we propose an
algorithm, shown in Algorithm 1, having two main phases, each
of which solves a corresponding subgame.
First subgame solution: For the first subgame, a suitable
solution would be a stable and optimal matching µ∗, defined as
follows [21]:
Definition 2: A user-access point matching µ∗ is said to be
stable, if there does not exist any pair of users i, j ∈ N that
are assigned (using µ∗), respectively, to access points a, b ∈ A,
although j prefers a to b, i.e., a j b and a prefers j to i, i.e.,
j a i. Further, a matching µ
∗ is said to be optimal, if every
user is at least as well off under it as under any other stable
assignment.
To find such a stable and optimal matching for our first
subgame, we use the Gale and Shapley deferred acceptance
method, first introduced in [21], and shown to reach a stable and
optimal matching between the colleges and the students. The
deferred acceptance method is described in details in Phase I
of Algorithm 1. In essence, after ranking one another using the
preferences in (8), (9), and (11), the users start by submitting
their applications for assignment to their top preferred access
point. Then, each access point a ∈ A receives the requests,
e.g., over a control channel, and places the top ranked qa
users/applicants on a waiting list, while rejecting the rest. The
procedure repeats as the rejected applicants submit requests
for admission to their next preferred access point. Again, each
access point a places, on a new waiting list, the top ranked qa
users among the previous waiting list and the new applicants,
and rejects the rest. This procedure is repeated and converges
to a stable and optimal matching µ∗ once every applicant in
N is placed on a certain waiting list [21] (or has been rejected
from every access point, but, this case is unlikely to happen
in the proposed model since the macro-stations’ quotas can fit
all users, if adequate resources are available) in which case
the access points make their initial admissions lists as per the
matching µ∗, which constitutes the solution to the first subgame.
The matching µ∗ resulting from the deferred acceptance
method is stable and optimal for networks in which the users
are mainly interested in guaranteeing a certain R-factor level,
as per (11). One example is a network in which the users
are interested in voice messaging services or interactive voice
response (IVR) services in which the service quality is not
sensitive to variations in the R-factor above a certain guaranteed
value. In such networks, it is possible to consider the matching
µ∗ as a suitable solution for the overall admissions game.
Second subgame solution: As soon as Phase I con-
verges to a matching µ∗ equivalent to a partition ΠDA =
{S1, . . . , SM+K} of N , the access points open a window
for transfers to the users, which indicates the start of the
second subgame. Basically, the second subgame enables the
users to explore possibilities for improving their R-factors by
transferring to other access points, within the matching µ∗,
6Algorithm 1 One round of the proposed algorithm for the studied small
cell admissions game with transfers
Initial network
The network starts with an initial assignment (at the beginning of all time no user is
assigned to any access point).
Phase I - Admissions Game with R-factor Guarantees:
This phase is based on the deferred acceptance algorithm.
a) Each user builds a preferences list based on its guaranteed R-factor as per (11).
b) Each SCBS and macro-station builds its preference list based, respectively, on
(8) and (9).
c) Each user applies to its most preferred access point.
d) After all users submit their applications, each access point a ranks its applicants
and creates a waiting list based on the top qa applicants while rejecting the rest.
repeat
a) The rejected applicants re-apply to their next best choice.
b) Each access point a creates a new waiting list out of the top qa applicants,
among its previous list and the set of new applicants, and rejects the rest.
until Every user is on a waiting list, and, thus, we have convergence to a stable matching
µ∗ that can be seen as a partition ΠDA.
Phase II - Transfers Coalitional Game:
Within the partition ΠDA = {S1, . . . , SM+K} from Phase I, the access points
open a window for transfers to the users.
repeat
a) Each user indicates its most preferred transfer.
b) The access points implicated in transfers, receive the applications, and,
sequentially:
b.1) An access point that receives a single transfer application decides whether
or not to accept the transfer based on the acceptance rule as per Section III-C.
b.2) An access point that receives multiple transfer requests will select the top
preferred users and decides whether to accept its transfer or not, as per
Section III-C.
until Convergence to a final Nash-stable partition Πfinal.
Phase III - Data Transmission:
The users are assigned to their access points and can transmit.
based on the actual R-factor in (4). The need for the transfers
is primarily important in networks in which the outcome of the
deferred acceptance method does not fill all (or a significant
part of) the quotas of the SCBSs and macro-stations (e.g.,
medium-sized networks). Inherently, the transfers coalitional
game enables a better load balance at the access points and
improves the performance of the network and users.
For solving the second subgame, we propose a coalition
formation algorithm based on the transfer rule as described
in details in Phase II of Algorithm 1. In this phase, starting
with the partition ΠDA resulting from the deferred acceptance
method, each user makes its most preferred transfer request,
i.e., the transfer that increases most its R-factor as per (4).
The transfer requests are then received by the access points
and, based on (8) and (9), each access point a ∈ A chooses
its most preferred applicant i wishing to transfer from another
access point b. Access points a and b negotiate, in a pairwise
manner, whether or not the transfer can be accepted given the
current partition, i.e., the quota of a is not exceeded and the
overall utility of the two involved access points increases. If
the acceptance conditions are satisfied, then a and b agree on
the transfer of i. In this process, the acceptance of the transfers
occurs at the level of the access points, sequentially, in any
arbitrary order. The process is repeated until convergence, which
is guaranteed, as follows:
Theorem 1: Starting from any initial partition ΠDA, the pro-
posed coalition formation algorithm for transfers is guaranteed
to converge to a final partition Πfinal.
Proof: Given a partition ΠDA resulting from the deferred
acceptance phase of Algorithm 1, the coalition formation pro-
cess can be seen as a sequence of transfer operations that
transform the network’s partition, e.g.,
Π0 = ΠDA → Π1 → Π2 → . . . , (12)
where Πl = {S1, . . . , SM+K} is a partition, composed of at
most M +K coalitions (since each coalition forms at a given
access point) that is formed after l transfers. Recall that every
transfer operation from an access point a to an access point b
yields
v(Sa \ {i}) + v(Sb ∪ {i}) > v(Sa) + v(Sb). (13)
As a transfer between two access points a and b in a partition
Πl, does not affect the total utility generated by coalitions in Πl\
{Sa, Sb} (since advanced interference management techniques
such as in [4], [16], and [17] are used), then, every transfer
Πl → Πk, forms an order such that
Πk → Πl ⇔
∑
Sm∈Πk
v(Sm) >
∑
Sp∈Πl
v(Sp), (14)
which is transitive and irreflexive. Therefore, for any two
partitions in the sequence (12), we have Πl 6= Πk, l 6= k.
As the number of partitions of a set is finite and equal to the
Bell number [22], then, the sequence in (12) is guaranteed to
converge to a final partition Πfinal.
Partition Πfinal is the final access point assignment, after
which the users start their data transmission in the last phase
of Algorithm 1. Although the partition Πfinal results from
the transformation of a stable matching µ∗, it is difficult to
guarantee analytically that this stability is preserved within
Πfinal after transfers. Intuitively, one can see that, whenever the
number of transfers is small, such as in a dense network, the
stability of the matching will be maintained. Nevertheless, we
can guarantee a weaker for of stability for Πfinal [26]:
Definition 3: A partition Π = {S1, . . . , SM+K} of a players
set N is Nash-stable if for every user i ∈ N , i ∈ Sa, Sa ∈ Π,
having a preference relation Bi over its possible coalitions at
access points in A, we have ∀i ∈ N , Sa i Sb ∪ {i} for all
Sb ∈ Π ∪ {∅}, i /∈ Sb.
A coalition partition Π is Nash-stable, if no user has an
incentive to move from its current coalition to another coalition
in Π based on a well-defined preference order Bi. The transfer
operation as per Definition 1, can be mapped into such a
preference order Bi, such that, for any user i, a coalition
Sa, i ∈ Sa is preferred over another coalition Sb ∪ {i},
i.e., Sa Bi Sb if Ui(ρib, τb) > Ui(ρia, τa), |Sb| ≤ qb, and
v(Sa \{i})+v(Sb∪{i}) > v(Sa)+v(Sb). With this definition,
a Nash-stable partition becomes a partition in which no user
has an incentive to execute a transfer rule, and, consequently,
we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Starting from any initial assignment (including
the case in which no user is assigned to any access point),
Algorithm 1 always converges to a Nash-stable partition in the
preference order Bi.
Proof: First, Phases I and II of Algorithm 1 are guaranteed
to converge as per [21] and Theorem 1, respectively. Assume
that a partition Πfinal resulting from Algorithm 1 is not Nash-
stable; then there exists a user i ∈ Sa, Sa ∈ Πfinal and a
coalition Sb ∈ Πfinal, such that Sb ∪ {i} Bi Sa, and user i
can transfer from Sa to Sb (given the approval of the SCBSs).
However, this contradicts the convergence result of Theorem 1
and, thus, Πfinal must be Nash-stable.
In a practical network, to implement Algorithm 1, each
macro-station or SCBS will broadcast a pilot signal over a
control channel that contains information on its delay guarantees
and will discover the users using any common technique used
in cellular networks [14]. Meanwhile, the users will monitor
the pilot channel, obtain the delay information and estimate
the PSR to each access point, using standard signal processing
7                 	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

              
 
 





ﬀ
ﬁ
ﬂ
ﬃ
ﬂ
ﬁ 
 


ﬀ
!


" #  $   $  %  & '   ( $ ) * )  ' %     
" #  $   $  %  & '   ( $ ) * %  )  ' %     
+   ) , - . /  0 *   
Fig. 2. Performance, in terms of average utility per user (i.e., R-factor as per
(4)), as the number of users N increases for a network with K = 10 SCBSs.
techniques. The use of such pilot signals for user-to-access-point
interaction is common in many standard wireless systems [1].
Then, the users and access points can build their preferences
based on (8), (9), and (11). Subsequently, the users and ac-
cess points engage in the deferred acceptance method while
signalling their preferences over control channels. The access
points can start finalizing their initial waiting once they note
an absence of new requests. Then, the access points inform the
users of the admitted lists, convey their potential delay using the
pilot signal, and open a window for transfer. Afterwards, users
that are interested in improving their actual rates investigate
potential transfers by monitoring, once again, the pilot signal.
Subsequently, the transfer process can be performed in a manner
analogous to the deferred acceptance procedure. We note that
the transfer process would require pairwise interactions, over
the backbone, between involved access points. With regards to
complexity, although no known results exist for the deferred
acceptance procedure in the general many-to-one case [22],
experimental analysis and complexity bounds suggest that the
algorithm, in general, has a reasonable complexity which mo-
tivates its adoption in several settings [22]. For the transfers
algorithm, the complexity lies in the process of identifying
transfer operations which, from a user’s perspective, has a worst
case complexity of O(M + K). However, the users can, in
practice, look for potential transfers progressively by exploring
some specific network characteristics, e.g., starting with the
closest, or with assistance from the access points.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For simulations, we consider a macro-cell network composed
of M = 2 adjacent cells, with each cell being a square area
of 1 km × 1 km with the macro-station at the center. In this
macro-cell network, we randomly deploy the SCBSs and the
users. We set all users’ transmit powers to 20 mW, the noise
plus interference level to an average of −110 dBm (at all access
points), the slot duration to θ = 20 ms, the propagation loss to
α = 3, the modulation scheme used is BPSK, and β = 1. Unless
stated otherwise, the packet size to B = 256 bits and the quota
of the SCBSs is set to a typical value of qk = 4, ∀k ∈ K [1].
The backhaul delay is based on a Pareto distribution with a
Pareto index of 1.16 (80-20 rule) which is known to be one
suitable delay model for backbone traffic [18]. We select the
1 2 3 2 4 2 5 2 6 2 7 2 8 2 9 2 : 2 2
: 2
1 2
3 2
4 2
5 2
6 2
7 2
; < = > ? @ A B < C ? @ C D ; E
F G
H
I
J
K
H
L
M
I
N
O P
Q
J
N
H
R
N
H
I
R
O
S
T
S
O U
V W = X C C X A Y C Z [ = ? \ X ] ^ ] @ [ Y C B ? @ C
V W = X C C X A Y C Z [ = ? \ X ] ^ Y A ] @ [ Y C B ? @ C
_ ? C ] ` a b c C d ^ ? = ?
Fig. 3. Worst-case user utility (averaged over random locations of SCBSs and
users) for a network with K = 10 SCBSs as the number of users N varies.
backhaul delay’s scale factors of the SCBSs and macro-stations
as 40 ms and 15 ms, respectively. For services, we select the
G.729 codec; hence υ1 = 12, υ2 = 15 and υ3 = 0.6 [19].
All statistical results are averaged, via about 10, 000 runs, over
possible locations of the SCBSs and users and realizations of
the backhaul delay.
In Fig. 2, we show the average utility per user resulting from
the proposed small cell admissions game, with and without
transfers, for a network with K = 10 SCBSs, as the number of
users N increases. The performance is compared with a best-
PSR algorithm that is commonly used in practical networks [1]
and in which each user selects the access point with the best
PSR while respecting the quotas [1]. Note that this scheme has
been selected for comparison purposes since, to the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the first in the literature that deals
with the assignment problem in the context of uplink small
cell networks and our studied model is significantly different
from those used in classical cellular networks such as in [13]
and [14]. Fig. 2 shows that, as N increases, the performance,
i.e., R-factors as per (4), of all three algorithms decreases,
due to the increasing delay. Fig. 2 demonstrates that, at all
network sizes, the proposed game with and without transfers,
yields a performance advantage over the best-PSR algorithm.
This advantage reaches up to 23% of utility improvement
relative to the best-PSR algorithm at N = 100 users. Also,
Fig. 2 corroborates the fact that the use of transfers presents
an advantage mainly for low-to-medium sized networks, i.e.,
between N = 40 and N = 70. This advantage starts decreasing
beyond N = 70 users, as the quotas start to fill up.
We further assess the performance of the proposed algo-
rithm by showing, in Fig. 3, the average utility achieved by
the worst-case user, i.e., cell-edge users, for a network with
K = 10 SCBSs, as the number of users N varies. Fig. 3
shows that, at all values of N , the proposed admissions game
with and without transfers yields a significant advantage over
the best-PSR algorithm. This advantage is increasing with the
network size N . This is due to the fact that, as more users
are deployed, the proposed admissions game handles efficiently
the preferences of the users and, hence, yields a performance
advantage reaching, for the games with and without transfers,
respectively, up to 93.5% and 50.8% relative to the best-PSR
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Fig. 4. Worst-case user utility (averaged over random locations of SCBSs and
users) for a network with K = 10 SCBSs and N = 60 users as the quota per
SCBS varies.
algorithm, at N = 100 users. Furthermore, Fig. 3 demonstrates
that the use of college transfers significantly improves the
performance of the worst-case user as the proposed game with
transfers has a performance advantage increasing with N and
reaching up to 28.5% relative to the game with no transfers.
Combining this result with the results of Fig. 2 demonstrates
that, as the network size increases, the benefit from using college
transfers is more pronounced for the users experiencing poor
performance and who are more apt to transfer to another access
point, if and when possible.
Fig. 4 shows the achieved average utility for the worst-
case user as the quota per SCBS varies for a network with
K = 10 SCBSs and N = 60 users. In this figure, we can see
that, as the quota increases, the average utility for the worst-case
user increases for all three schemes. This result is due to the
fact that, as the quota increases, the assignment possibilities for
the users increase (even in the best-PSR scheme), and, thus, a
better utility can be achieved. As the quota becomes larger, the
best-PSR algorithm’s performance improves; however, it is still
outperformed by the proposed admissions game at all quotas.
In fact, Fig. 4 demonstrates that, at all quotas, the proposed
admissions game with transfers yields a performance advantage
between 21.4% for a quota of 10 users per SCBS and 51%
for a quota of 2 users per SCBS, relative to the best-PSR
scheme. The advantage of the proposed game is larger for small
quotas which demonstrates the fact that the proposed algorithm
is well-adapted to the resource-constrained nature of small cells.
Fig. 4 also shows that, as the quota increases, the potential for
performing transfers increases, thus improving the advantage
of the game with transfers over the game with no transfers.
This performance advantage reaches up to 15% as the quota is
around 10 users per SCBS.
Fig. 5 shows, for the proposed game with transfers and the
best-PSR scheme, the average number of users that achieve a
certain R-factor level for K = 10 SCBSs and N = 60 users.
The histogram of Fig. 5 clearly shows that the small cell
admissions game enables the shifting of a significant number of
users to better R-factor levels relative to the best-PSR algorithm.
For example, compared to the best-PSR scheme, about 22% of
the networks users improve from an “acceptable” service level
(range of ]60−70]) to a “good” service level (range of ]70−80])
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10 SCBSs, and N = 60 users.
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Fig. 6. Average number of iterations till convergence of the deferred acceptance
algorithm (Phase I) in Algorithm 1 as the number of users and SCBSs varies.
with a small fraction having a “high” R-factor above 80. Also,
while for the best-PSR algorithm, an average of 10 users have
a poor service quality (R-factor below 60), using the proposed
game, less than 2 users (on the average) experience such poor
service. Hence, the proposed game yields, not only average
utility gains, but also an improved users’ service quality.
Fig. 6 shows the average number of iterations needed for
convergence of the deferred acceptance algorithm in Phase I of
Algorithm 1 as N and K vary. Fig. 6 shows that, for medium
sized networks with N ≤ 50, the average number of iterations
till convergence at K = 10 and K = 20 is comparable.
But, as N increases above 50, we can see in Fig. 6 that the
average number of iterations increases, from about 4 iterations
at N = 20 at all K to around 15.6 and 26.7, for K = 10 SCBSs
and K = 20 SCBSs, respectively (at N = 200). In fact, Fig. 6
shows that, as the number of users becomes large relative to the
number of SCBSs, i.e., at N > 80 for K = 10 SCBSs and at
N > 120 for K = 20 SCBSs, the average number of iterations
becomes almost constant. This is due to the fact that, as N
becomes large relative to M +K, it is likely that each access
point’s preferred users would still submit their applications
at about the same iteration, hence, not requiring many extra
rounds till convergence. Thus, Fig. 6 shows that the deferred
acceptance algorithm presents a reasonable convergence time
and its complexity grows relatively slowly with N and K.
Fig. 7 shows the average utility achieved by each SCBS
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Fig. 7. Performance, in terms of average SCBS utility as per (6), as the packet
size B varies for a network with K = 10 SCBSs and N = 100 users
as per (6) as the packet size B varies for a network with
K = 10 SCBSs. First, we can seen from Fig. 7 that, as B
increases, the average SCBS utility achieved by the proposed
game increases while that of the best-PSR algorithm decreases.
In essence, as B increases, the possibility of having users
experiencing low macro-cell PSRs due to their traffic and
distances from their macro-stations becomes large. As a result,
the proposed game enables the SCBSs to better offload these
users from the macro-station as corroborated by the increase
in the utility with B shown in Fig. 7 (recall from (6) that the
SCBS utility is a function, not only of the users achieved PSR
but also of its potential best PSR with respect to the macro-
cellular network). In contrast, assignments resulting from the
best-PSR algorithm do not account for the SCBSs preferences
at all, as intuitively expected. Fig. 7 shows that the proposed
game presents a significant performance advantage, in terms of
average SCBS utility, increasing with the packet size B and
reaching up to 69% improvement at B = 2048 bits relative to
the best-PSR scheme. In summary, Fig. 7 demonstrates that
the proposed game enables, not only the users to improve
their preferences, but also the SCBSs’ hence ensuring that all
involved decision makers satisfy, as much as possible, their
preference.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the problem of user assignment
within a small cell wireless network, given the preferences and
capabilities of the three involved nodes: the users, the small cell
base stations, and the macro-stations. To do so, we have for-
mulated a college admissions game with transfers in which the
access points and the users rank one another, in an effort to reach
an agreement over a user-to-access point assignment, given the
nodes’ preferences. We have defined well-suited preferences
that capture the users’ need to optimize their packet success
rates and delays as well as the SCBSs’ incentive to offload
traffic from the macro-cell network and extend its coverage. To
solve the game, we have proposed a two-phase algorithm: a
first phase based on the deferred acceptance algorithm, which
finds a stable matching with R-factor guarantees; and a second
phase, based on coalition formation games, which enables the
users to transfer from one access point to another, when and
if possible. We have shown the convergence of the algorithm
and have discussed the properties of the resulting partition.
Using simulations, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of
our proposed college admissions game with transfer. Future
work can address a number of interesting open questions and
directions, including extending the work to a dynamic-game
setting to handle handovers or enabling the users to simulta-
neously connect to multiple access points (e.g., for diversity)
and to account for advanced communication techniques such as
cooperative communications or interference alignment.
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